



Multilevel Fair Allocation under Additive Preferences

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Model and motivations

Motivations: Solving fair allocation problems in hierarchical structure (e.g. in university, across a territory, ...)

Model:

- ▶ a set of indivisible items $\mathcal{G} = \{g_1, \dots, g_m\}$
- ▶ a set of nodes $\mathcal{N} = \{1, \dots, n\}$ organized in a hierarchical structure represented by a tree \mathcal{T} .
- ▶ any node i has a weight $w_i \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$.




Figure 1: The hierarchical structure of a university. In orange, the weights.

A **complete multilevel allocation** π satisfies:

1. $\pi(1) = \mathcal{G}$,
2. $\pi(i) = \cup_{j \in \text{children}(i)} \pi(j)$ for an internal node i ,
3. $\pi(i) \cap \pi(j) = \emptyset$ for two siblings i, j ,

where $\pi(i)$ denotes the bundle of any node $i \in \mathcal{N}$

Utilities: there is a difference between internal nodes and leaves.

- ▶ **Internal node i :** utility v_i is the sum of the utility of its children.
⇒ it evaluates a **multilevel allocation**.
- ▶ **Leaf x :** utility u_x is a classical additive utility over the items.
⇒ it evaluates a **bundle of items**.

Algorithm

We propose a **multilevel extension** of the Weighted Round Robin, denoted **MWRR** hereafter:

- 1: **Input:** Tree \mathcal{T} , items \mathcal{G} , nodes valuations
- 2: **Output:** Multilevel allocation π
- 3: _____
- 4: Initialise an empty multilevel allocation π
- 5: Initialise picking scores to 0
- 6: Initialise a set of remainings items, i.e. $\mathcal{RI} \leftarrow \mathcal{G}$
- 7: **while** $\mathcal{RI} \neq \emptyset$ **do**
- 8: Select leaf x recursively with the least picking score divided by its weight
- 9: Let x choose her favorite item in \mathcal{RI}
- 10: Update the bundles of x and its ancestors
- 11: $\mathcal{RI} \leftarrow \mathcal{RI} \setminus \{g\}$
- 12: **end while**
- 13: **return** π

Fairness

Problem: Most fairness notions require agents to evaluate bundles, which our internal nodes cannot do!

We equip internal nodes with **estimated utility functions** to evaluate bundles. Given an internal node i , and a bundle $S \subseteq \mathcal{G}$, we propose 3 functions:

- ▶ **Optimistic:** $\hat{v}_i(S)$ – utility of S given the optimal allocation to the leaves of i ,
- ▶ **Agnostic:** $\bar{v}_i(S)$ – weighted average utility of S ,
- ▶ **Pessimistic:** $\check{v}_i(S)$ – utility of S given the worst allocation to the leaves of i .

Agnostic Fairness: A multilevel allocation is **M[agno]-WEF1** if for any nodes j, k with the same parent, we have

$$\frac{v_j(\pi)}{w_j} \geq \frac{\bar{v}_j(\pi(k) \setminus \{g\})}{w_k}$$

for some item $g \in \pi(k)$.

Objective: computing a complete and M[pess/agno/opt]-WEF1 multilevel allocation.

Example: Let $\mathcal{G} = \{g_1, \dots, g_5\}$, and $\mathcal{N} = \{1, \dots, 7\}$ organized as in Fig. 1.

Leaves	g_1	g_2	g_3	g_4	g_5
$\{4, 6\}$	0.1	0.1	0.35	0.1	0.35
$\{5, 7\}$	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2

Table 1: Preferences of the leaves.

- ▶ **Optimistic:** $\hat{v}_3(\{g_3, g_5\}) = 0.7$,
- ▶ **Agnostic:** $\bar{v}_3(\{g_3, g_5\}) = 0.55$,
- ▶ **Pessimistic:** $\check{v}_3(\{g_3, g_5\}) = 0.4$.

⇒: It will impact the fairness notions we can ensure.

Identical preferences

Identical Preferences: all leaves have the same preferences.

⇒ for any node i and any bundle S , $\hat{v}_i(S) = \bar{v}_i(S) = \check{v}_i(S)$.

⇒ Hence, the three fairness notions coincide.

Theorem: MWRR returns a complete M-WEF1 allocation.

Theorem: MWRR is also EF1 at the leaves if w_i is the number of leaves of the subtree rooted in i , for all nodes i .

General preferences

Theorem: MWRR returns a complete M[pess]-WEF1 allocation.

Theorem: MWRR may fail to return an M[agno/opt]-WEF1 allocation.

Theorem: MWRR cannot even guarantee to find an α -approximation of M[agno]-WEF1, for some $\alpha > 0$.

Experimentations

Protocol: We generated instances varying:

- ▶ the structure of the trees,
- ▶ the weights scheme of the agents,
- ▶ the preference generation methods.

$n = 15, m = 15$	$n = 127, m = 254$
0.0002 sec.	0.0191 sec.

Table 2: Average runtime for balanced trees.

Key Results

- ▶ Fast and scalable: see for example Table 2
- ▶ M[agno]-WEF1 almost always satisfied: < 50 unfair allocations out of $\simeq 200,000$.
- ▶ M[opt]-WEF1 is challenging: up to 100% of unfair allocations.

Perspectives

The model could be extended further:

- ▶ Using a DAG to represent the hierarchical structure.
- ▶ Finding stronger fairness notions with provable guarantees than M[pess]-WEF1.
- ▶ Adapting other algorithms to the multilevel setting.

Full paper can be found here:

